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Abstract
How one defines the term ‘ecosystem’ is of 
central importance in arriving at good policy deci-
sions regarding ecosystem management, so guide-
lines are needed on how to adequately introduce 
the term ‘ecosystem’ in scientific and policy dis-
course.  My goal in this paper is to outline how one 
might approach this matter from the perspective 
of Rudolf Carnap’s ‘principle of tolerance’. I be-
gin by outlining two interpretations of what Car-
nap means by being tolerant in introducing a scien-
tific term – what I call ‘conditional’ and ‘absolute’ 
interpretations – and then apply these interpreta-
tions to the case of introducing the term ‘ecosys-
tem’.  Specifically, I reconstruct the development 
of the ecosystem concept, starting from notions 
of a biotic community proposed in the mid-19th 
century, and working up to Eugene Odum’s pres-
ent-day authoritative definition of an ‘ecosystem’. 
Reflection on this developmental history of the 
ecosystem concept reveals a number of empirical 
obstacles in arriving at an adequate definition of 
‘ecosystem’, obstacles that have led some ecosys-
tem scientists to resort to pragmatic approaches in 
defining ecosystems.  What I show is that this pre-
sumed reliance on pragmatics is best handled if one 
interprets the introduction of the term ‘ecosystem’ 
along the lines of a conditional approach to Carna-
pian tolerance.
Keywords: ecosystem, Rudolf Carnap, prag-
matics, principle of tolerance, Arthur Tansley, Eu-
gene Odum.
Introduction
One of Rudolf Carnap’s more notable philo-
sophical contributions is his ‘principle of tolerance’, 
versions of which recur throughout his career.  Per-
haps the most iconic statement of tolerance oc-
curs The Logical Syntax of Language (Carnap, 
1934/1937) where Carnap says, “in logic, there are 
no morals” (p. 52).  This liberality in choosing sys-
tems of logic extends in Carnap’s subsequent “Em-
piricism, Semantic and Ontology” (Carnap, 1956) 
to a liberality concerning the choice of linguistic 
frameworks.  We might call this Carnap’s ‘mature’ 
version of the principle of tolerance: it is the ver-
sion of tolerance expressed in Carnap’s “Intellec-
tual Biography”, where he suggests that “everyone is 
free to use the language most suited to his purpose” 
(Carnap, 1963, p.18).  On this approach, alternative 
philosophical viewpoints are answers to ‘external 
questions’ regarding which linguistic framework to 
use (as opposed to ‘internal’ questions resolvable 
solely by reference to the language system itself). 
Philosophies, in effect, are different linguistic ‘pro-
posals’ which possess varying degrees of practical 
value, and it is the estimation of such value that mo-
tivates the proposers of language systems to adopt 
some framework, or not.
The philosophical question we face in this paper 
is how to best understand this latter (mature) ver-
sion of Carnap’s principle of tolerance. Specifical-
ly we ask what tolerance prescribes when it comes 
to the introduction of a new term into a language 
system. There are two readings of tolerance we will 
consider here, which we call ‘absolute tolerance’ 
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(AT) and ‘conditional tolerance’ (CT).  AT and CT 
provide guidance on ‘term introduction’: they tell us 
how to approach the introduction of a new theoreti-
cal term into a language system. Here is AT:
One should always be ‘tolerant’ in deciding 
whether or not to introduce a term ‘X’ in our vo-
cabulary. We simply stipulate its use and incorpo-
rate it directly into our theorizing and empirical re-
search. There are no empirical constraints on such 
a stipulation; the introduction of a term always has a 
pragmatic dimension; and introduced terms are de-
scriptive of the world, if that is the intent of the in-
troducer (though perhaps falsely).
For many philosophers, this is how one should 
understand Carnap’s use of the principle of toler-
ance in “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” 
and in the “Intellectual Biography”. The circum-
stances motivating the introduction of a term are 
said to be determined solely on pragmatic grounds 
and not at all governed by empirical factors. As such 
absolute tolerance is prescribed both as regards 
one’s choice of terms and as regards the parameters 
of their use, since there are no prior limitations on 
what counts as an appropriate pragmatic factor that 
can influence one’s choice, and empirical factors 
are deemed irrelevant for this choice (some even ar-
gue that the use of empirical facts is prohibited with 
term introduction since such facts are meaningless 
in advance of the term’s incorporation into the lan-
guage system, a matter I discuss below). Addition-
ally, when AT says that the term is ‘descriptive’, the 
suggestion is that the term should be taken literally: 
the proposer of the term means to describe the real 
world and not some fictional world (that is, we are 
concerned only with non-fictional languages, such 
as the language of science). For AT, it is not thought 
that the inevitable and exclusively pragmatic di-
mensions of term introduction pose an obstacle to 
the objectivity of term use (an assumption, however, 
that we shall contest later on.). CT, by comparison, 
stipulates the following:
If term ‘X’ has no cognitive status other than as 
a ‘proposal’ to use language in a certain way (i.e., 
it lacks empirical constraints and is only a logical, 
philosophical term), then we should be ‘tolerant’ in 
deciding whether or not to introduce this term in 
our vocabulary.  Our choice to use this term will in-
evitably be motivated by practical considerations, 
and the term is not descriptive of the world (regard-
less of the intent of the introducer).
That is, tolerance is ‘conditional’: one can be 
tolerant as regards the introduction of a term if this 
term lacks empirical import, but where the term 
does have empirical implications one should let 
those implications guide term introduction (per-
haps to the point of deciding not to introduce the 
term). Moreover, only in the latter case is a term de-
scriptive (i.e., to be taken literally). Where empirical 
constraints are lacking, and pragmatic factors take 
hold in term introduction, one can regard the term 
as (strictly speaking) fictional. People can still use 
the term and even be passionate about the entities 
that the term purportedly refers to. At occasional 
junctures, however, they may need to be reminded 
that the term doesn’t actually describe, or even have 
the capability of describing, anything in the world.  
To assist in understanding these two forms of 
tolerance I provide Table 1.
Table 1. A comparison of the conditional (CT) and 
absolute (AT) readings of Carnap’s principle of 
tolerance.
CT AT
Do empirical
 facts guide term
 introduction?
Yes No
Are pragmatic
factors relevant to
term introduction?
Sometimes Always
Should we be
tolerant with term
introduction?
Sometimes Always
Are defined terms 
descriptive of the
world?
 Sometimes  
(if the relevant
 empirical criteria 
are satisfied)
Always
(whenever
so
 intended)
At this stage there is the interesting exegetical 
question of which version of tolerance was advo-
cated by Carnap.  The received view on this issue 
has been that Carnap advocates AT; I argue, contra 
the received view, that he is allied to CT (Hudson, 
2010). One of the key determinants that bears on the 
resolution of this matter is how a term, in advance 
of its introduction in a language system, can receive 
the benefit of empirical evidence either for or against 
its use. Thomas Ricketts (1994, 2007) and Michael 
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Friedman (2001) don’t find much sense in such a 
possibility – they represent the orthodox view that 
terms acquire cognitive status and have empirical 
constraints on their introduction only within a lin-
guistic framework – and so they vouch for a reading 
of tolerance along the lines of AT as a way of (chari-
tably) reading Carnap.  My view, on the other hand, 
argues for the feasibility of thinking about empirical 
evidence as independent of a language system, an 
approach I ascribe to Carnap on the basis of his be-
haviourist reading of observation reports during the 
1930’s (see Hudson, 2010).  In this paper, we leave 
this exegetical issue aside and simply assume as pri-
ma facie feasible both the CT and the mainstream 
AT approaches; those keen to be more philosophi-
cally reassured of the viability of CT versus AT, or 
who have an interest in the relevant exegesis with re-
gard to Carnap, are encouraged to consult the writ-
ings of Ricketts, Friedman and myself.  If it helps, 
one can think of the CT approach modestly where 
empirical evidence is nevertheless expressed in a 
language prior to the term being introduced (which 
is in effect to grant Ricketts’ and Friedman’s point 
about there not being any pure extra-linguistic per-
spective) – the language is just not one that al-
ready contains the term of interest.  Independently 
of adopting this interpretive convenience, the mat-
ter we are concerned with in this paper still stands: 
should one view the introduction of a term in a lan-
guage system as empirically guided, as with CT, or 
as independent of empirical guidance, as with AT?
Methodology
My plan is to argue on behalf of CT as against 
AT, using as an illustrative case study the recent in-
troduction of the term ‘ecosystem’ in environmen-
tal science. The case is an interesting one for at least 
two reasons.  First of all, ‘ecosystem’ is a scientif-
ic term and so should be amenable to a Carnapi-
an treatment, given Carnap’s stated bias towards the 
scientific world-view.  Secondly, it is a term fraught 
with strong practical, even political dimensions, and 
so it will be incumbent on us to pronounce on the 
role of these dimensions in introducing this term. 
It is the impact of these practical dimensions that 
turns out to be the key factor in deciding between 
CT and AT. Since the introduction of any term in a 
language system will naturally have some practical 
bearing, the argument I am providing for CT with 
respect to the term ‘ecosystem’ can be analogous-
ly made out with regard to the introduction of any 
term, though maybe less vividly than in the case of 
ecosystems.
 The boundary problem
 A relatively standard definition for ‘ecosystem’ 
is not hard to find.  The 1993 Convention on Bi-
ological Diversity defines an ‘ecosystem’ as “a dy-
namic complex of plant, animal and micro-organ-
ism communities and their non-living environment 
interacting as a functional unit” (Article 2).  The 
United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) provides a fact sheet, “Climate Change and 
Ecosystems” (published April 2010), according to 
which: 
an ecosystem is an interdependent system of 
plants, animals, and microorganisms interact-
ing with one another and with their physical 
environment. An ecosystem can be as large as 
the Mojave Desert or as small as a local pond. 
Ecosystems provide people with food, goods, 
medicines, and many other products. They 
also play a vital role in nutrient cycling, water 
purification, and climate moderation. 
These definitions, and other contemporary ones, 
share certain features. In particular, ecosystems in-
volve ‘interacting parts’, where some parts are biot-
ic (such as plants and animals) and some are abiotic 
(such as the sun’s rays and soil). What the EPA defi-
nition adds is, first of all, a statement of how vague 
the boundaries of ecosystems are, with sizes rang-
ing over many orders of magnitude.  Secondly, the 
EPA is explicit regarding the practical dimensions 
of ecosystems, of how ecosystems can serve human 
interests.  Ecosystems are thus unusual among sci-
entific entities for the vagueness of their boundar-
ies and their inherent, practical benefits for human 
welfare.  How did environmental science get to the 
point of viewing ecosystems in this way?
As Frank Golley tells part of the story in A His-
tory of the Ecosystem Concept in Ecology (Golley, 
1993), environmental scientists in their early re-
searches into the existence of biotic communities 
(i.e., communities including plants and animals but 
excluding abiotic components) based their identifi-
cations on observable features of the environment. 
For instance, the botanist Anton Kerner in visiting 
the Danube Basin in the mid-19th century remarks:
whenever the reign of nature is not disturbed 
by human interference the different plant-
species join together in communities, each 
of which has a characteristic form, and con-
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stitutes a feature in the landscape of which it 
is a part. These communities are distribut-
ed and grouped together in a great variety of 
ways and, like the lines on a man’s face, they 
give a particular impress to the land where 
they grow  (Kerner, 1897, p. 885, as cited in 
Golley, 1993, p. 17).
Just as the lines of a man’s face are visibly apparent, 
Kerner takes plant communities to also be read-
ily identifiable on the basis of (naked-eye) obser-
vation, an attitude Golley takes to be characteris-
tic of ecologists at this time who, as he comments, 
“walked or rode across a community and observed 
the presence, absence, and abundance of various 
organisms and interpreted those patterns” (p. 19). 
A more quantitative, empirical method to identi-
fying biotic communities was adopted later on by 
Roscoe Pound and Frederic Clements (1897) in in-
vestigating the phytogeography of Nebraska. Us-
ing square quadrants to quantify the occurrence 
of plant species in pre-set areas, they observe that 
“the vegetation of the Earth’s surface is arranged 
into groups of definite constitution and of more or 
less definite limits.  Such a group is a plant forma-
tion.” (Pound & Clements, 1897, pp. 313-314; as 
cited in Golley, 1993, p.19).  A different sort of em-
pirical investigation was taken up by Charles Elton 
during the 1920’s based on observations made on 
Spitsbergen, the arctic island north of Norway.  As 
Paul Colinvaux describes Elton’s work in Why Big 
Fierce Animals Are Rare (1978; see chapter 3), El-
ton noticed on Spitsbergen and in other geograph-
ic areas that animal communities had hierarchical 
structures composed of numerous and proportion-
ately smaller primary consumers (e.g., rodents and 
small birds) along with larger (by an order of mag-
nitude) and much less numerous secondary con-
sumers (which are predators of the primary con-
sumers).  This structure has since become known 
as the Eltonian pyramid and, at least as Colinvaux 
describes Elton’s work, becoming aware of the pyr-
amid is a matter of a relatively uncomplicated ob-
servation.
Such empirical methods, however, face diffi-
culties when attempts are made to make them more 
precise. Notably, a problem arises when an attempt 
is made to specify the boundaries of biotic commu-
nities.  This problem, which following Golley we 
call the ‘boundary problem’, is acknowledged by 
Pound and Clements (1897), who comment:
[a plant formation] can rarely have defi-
nite limits, therefore, [it] must be bounded 
on every side by a more or less extensive belt 
in which the features of two adjacent forma-
tions are confused.  As in the case of species, 
it often becomes necessary to establish arbi-
trary limits, within which the preponderance 
of characteristics must be adopted as the 
mark of delimitation (Pound & Clements, 
1897, p. 315; as cited in Golley, 1993, p. 21).  
Expressions of the boundary problem multiply in 
the subsequent literature.  The botanist Henry Glea-
son recounts in both his works (1926) and (1939), 
on the basis of his observations of plant associa-
tions, that over time the constitution of such asso-
ciations varies to such a degree that it is impossible 
to consider “any such area of vegetation as a defi-
nitely organized unit” (Gleason, 1939, p. 51).  He 
notes a similar variability through space: he provides 
a number of examples describing how in tracing the 
path of a forest one finds a series of imperceptible 
changes that can lead one to think of it as the same 
forest from one end to the other – a conclusion that 
becomes obviously erroneous when one objectively 
compares the two endpoints and notices their ex-
traordinary differences.  For Gleason this impre-
cision regarding how to count plant associations – 
i.e., there is no principled way to decide whether 
the extended forest he describes is one community 
or a series of smaller ones – leads him to be skepti-
cal about their existence altogether  (as “definitely 
organized units”).  His response, alternatively, is to 
regard as real only the individuals (and individual 
species) that make up these associations, a view he 
calls ‘individualism’.
Jay Odenbaugh (2007) cites other examples 
where ecologists have performed empirical research 
that defies the view that biotic communities have 
identifiable boundaries (and thus count as real ob-
jects). For instance, he describes the work of Robert 
Whittaker during the 1950’s and 1960’s involving 
water and temperature gradient analyses performed 
on mountainside vegetation (Odenbaugh, 2007, 
pp. 633-637). Roughly, Whittaker found that the 
composition of plant communities as one ascends 
a mountainside (and thus moves to dryer, cool-
er regions) changes subtly and, just as with Glea-
son’s forests, one can’t distinguish any boundaries 
separating one community from the next (or even 
tell whether we are dealing with one community 
or a number of them). Odenburgh further recounts 
Margaret Davis’ work during the late 1970’s and 
early 1980’s mapping ancient tree species migra-
tions by means of the radiocarbon dating of fossil-
Social science section
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ized tree pollen. Davis discovered that forests didn’t 
seem to maintain their constitutional integrity over 
time; the constituent species moved independently 
in different directions, easily abandoning any com-
munity structure the forest might initially have had. 
Overall, then, if we take an empirical approach to 
identifying biotic communities, we fail to find any 
empirical markers for their existence and so seem 
forced to deny their reality.  All we are left with is 
the reality of the individuals that purportedly con-
stituted them.
Our assessment here might be different if we 
adopted a holistic approach to biotic communi-
ties, such as subsequently espoused by Freder-
ic Clements in his (1916), and later vigorously de-
fended by John Phillips in a series of three papers 
published in 1934 and 1935. On the Clements/Phil-
lips approach, biotic communities are ‘organisms’ 
(Clements, 1916, p. 36), or as Phillips calls them, 
‘complex organisms’ (Phillips, 1935, p. 489). These 
organisms undergo ‘ecological succession’ leading 
to a climax state; that is, a biotic community will 
undergo gradual changes in composition leading to 
an equilibrium, climax point where no more funda-
mental change occurs (such as with a ‘mature’ ani-
mal or plant).  And just like any other viable organ-
ism, Clements notes: 
each climax formation is able to reproduce 
itself, repeating with essential fidelity the 
stages of its development. The life history of 
a formation is a complex but definite process, 
comparable in its chief features with the life 
history of an individual plant (1916, p. 36).
A key feature of these ‘organisms’ is their possession 
of certain special ‘emergent’ properties, properties 
possessed only by the whole organism and by none 
of its parts. As Phillips sees them, complex (ecologi-
cal) organisms have emergent properties just as gun-
powder has the emergent property of explosiveness: 
one could not predict (or have expected) the emer-
gent properties of a complex organism just as one 
could not predict (or have expected) explosiveness 
to have been the result of combing sulphur, char-
coal and saltpetre (Phillips, 1935, p. 491).  There is 
naturally a lot more to say here regarding the role 
of emergent properties in ecological understanding. 
For now we can point to the value of such proper-
ties in underwriting an empirical criterion for the 
identification of biotic communities and in thus re-
solving the boundary problem. If biotic communi-
ties have special empirically-discernable, emergent 
properties not shared by their constituent members, 
then these properties could mark the existence of such 
communities, bypassing the problem of identifying their 
spatial and temporal boundaries.  In fact, with the no-
tion that the membership of a biotic community chang-
es in a predictable and repeatable way as we move to a 
climax state, we are able to explain away some of the 
difficulties in specifying where one biotic community 
stops and another begins. For example, with what ap-
pears to be two communities with an unclear boundary, 
we might actually have a single community succeeding 
towards an equilibrium state. 
The holistic approach, as formulated by Phillips, 
drew the attention of the ecologist Arthur Tansley who 
found it particularly objectionable. Tansley’s interest 
was likely piqued by Phillips’ portrayal of him as a ho-
list. Phillips asserts that, according to Tansley, 
Gleason’s reasons against the unit of vegetation 
being an organic entity are not convincing, that ob-
viously the phenomena of vegetation depend com-
pletely upon those of the individual but that this 
statement applies equally to the human community 
which everyone would agree must be considered an 
organic entity: units of vegetation possess some of the 
characters of organisms  (Phillips, 1935, p. 494, al-
luding to Tansley, 1920).
In response, Tansley (1935) sharply distanc-
es himself from Phillips’ holism. He complains that 
Phillips on behalf of holism presents no “scientific 
arguments” (p. 285), that “Phillips’ articles remind 
[Tansley] irresistibly of the exposition of a creed – 
of a closed system of religious or philosophical dog-
ma” (p. 285). Tansley further expresses doubt about 
Phillips’ invocation of the emergent properties of 
a whole as properties one could not have predicted 
given an awareness of the properties of the whole’s 
component parts.  In an argument that we will see 
repeated later on by more recent ecologists, Tansley 
complains:
who will be so bold as to say that [a] new en-
tity, for example the molecule of water and its 
qualities, would be unpredictable, if we really 
understood all the properties of hydrogen and 
oxygen atoms and the forces brought into play 
by their union? Unpredictable by us with our 
present knowledge, yes; but theoretically un-
predictable, surely not (1935, pp. 297-298).
Nonetheless, Tansley does not completely re-
ject Phillips’ viewpoint.  His more considered re-
sponse is to present a new notion – an extension of 
the notion of a biotic community – that becomes 
the working concept for all subsequent ecological 
thinking, the notion of an ‘ecosystem’:
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the more fundamental conception is, as it 
seems to me, the whole system (in the sense of 
physics), including not only the organism-com-
plex, but also the whole complex of physical fac-
tors forming what we call the environment of the 
biome – the habitat factors in the widest sense. 
Though the organisms may claim our primary 
interest, when we are trying to think fundamen-
tally we cannot separate them from their special 
environment, with which they form one physical 
system (Tansley, 1935, p. 299, his italics).
The key elements to Tansley’s notion of an ecosys-
tem are its reference to a ‘system’ (in its most gener-
al sense, a set of interacting parts), and its incorpo-
ration of abiotic, inorganic factors, thus making an 
ecosystem more than just a biotic community. One 
of the first applications of Tansley’s approach occurs 
in the work of Raymond Lindeman who performed 
detailed empirical research on a dying lake (Cedar 
Bog Lake in Minnesota) during the late 1930’s and 
early 1940’s with the goal of describing the trophic-
dynamic structure of the ecosystem instantiated in 
this lake. Lindeman’s work involved describing the 
lake’s food-chain: identifying its primary produc-
ers as well as its primary and secondary consum-
ers (the ecosystem’s ‘trophic-levels’), determining 
the relative abundances of producers and consum-
ers, assessing how nutrients are processed at the 
each trophic level, and so on. To a degree, Linde-
man took himself to be furthering both qualitatively 
and quantitatively the observations underlying the 
Eltonian pyramid (see Lindeman, 1941, p. 638 and 
1942, p. 408).  For example, two of his main contri-
butions were to provide rigorous empirical justifi-
cations for the both the decreased productivity and 
the increased efficiency of higher trophic levels (see 
1942, p. 415). 
Following Lindeman, the ecosystem concept re-
ceived its modern development through the work of 
Eugene Odum who found it useful to think of tro-
phic levels abstractly, making it unnecessary to re-
fer to the particular organism that occupies a trophic 
level (Golley, 1993, p. 77). Odum also sought to uti-
lize the first and second laws of thermodynamics in 
ecological thinking (Golley 1993, p. 81), from which 
one can explain, for example, the decreased produc-
tivity of higher trophic levels by reference to the dis-
sipation of energy as useless heat, as predicted by the 
second law. Still, even with Odum’s developments 
(which we have only sketched), the notion of an eco-
system has not escaped the boundary problem. Con-
sider the following passage from the 5th and latest 
edition of Odum’s definitive textbook on ecology, 
Fundamentals of Ecology, co-written Gary Barrett:
ecosystems are open systems. . . . The bound-
ary for the system can be arbitrary (whatever is 
convenient or of interest) . . .; or it can be natu-
ral, such as the shore of a lake, where the lake is 
to be the system (Odum & Barrett, 2005, p. 19).
It appears on one side that, for Odum, the boundar-
ies of an ecosystem can be a natural occurrence, dis-
covered objectively by inspection of the world and 
not delimited by ‘convenience or interest’, and that 
on the other they can be artificially created by hu-
mans, firmly delimited by ‘convenience or interest’. 
This is in fact an odd dichotomy.  Consider an artifi-
cially created lake constructed to look exactly like a 
real lake. Given that they are empirically indiscern-
ible, is there any reason for an ecologist to treat them 
any differently?  Does it matter that the artificial lake 
is identified by its ‘interest or convenience’ and the 
natural lake isn’t, given that the natural lake, by vir-
tue of its indistinguishability from the artificial lake, 
has the same interest or convenience?  Or again, 
what is a natural boundary?  If the shore of a lake is a 
natural boundary, why isn’t 10 feet in from the shore 
a natural boundary as well?
Given these sorts of problems, it’s not clear that 
Odum and Barrett have, to this extent, solved the 
boundary problem – and in fact the current, general 
consensus is that there is no definitive, empirical so-
lution to be found.  On Victor Marín’s view:
ecosystems ecology is conceptually based on 
the [general systems theory], and . . . there is 
nothing there, at least from first principles, 
that will lead us to an objective way to cre-
ate boundaries in ecological systems that we 
want to manage (Marín, 1997, p. 103).
Similarly, in considering the ecology of ecosystem 
services from a complex adaptive systems approach, 
J. B. Ruhl, Steven Kraft and Christopher Lant ac-
knowledge that “there are a number of scientifical-
ly useful ways of describing ecosystem boundaries, 
. . .  all [with] limitations”, and in the end they pass 
on the question of what is the correct view of eco-
systems boundaries to simply examining “which 
method . . . best serve[s] ecosystem service manage-
ment policy” (2007, p. 22).  Overall, the task of pro-
viding objective, empirical criteria for identifying 
ecosystems has been largely set aside by ecologists 
in deference to pragmatic determinations, as clear-
ly illustrated by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency fact sheet cited above.  The prevailing view 
is that ecosystems come in various shapes and sizes 
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and with various sorts of constitutions; according-
ly, depending on our ‘convenience or interest’, on 
our ‘ecosystem management policy’, or on which-
ever practical factors bear on our thinking, certain 
spatial and temporal regions are thereby arbitrarily 
designated as ecosystems.
 The significance of a pragmatic solution to 
the boundary problem
The resort to pragmatic factors in delimiting 
ecosystems can have a negative impact on ecosys-
tem science.  In simple terms, just because defin-
ing ‘ecosystem’ in a certain way has certain practi-
cal benefits doesn’t mean that there is a real thing 
that is an ecosystem, so defined. But worse than 
that, given that people often possess divergent val-
ue systems, it follows that there will be a plethora of 
conflicting opinions on what can count as an eco-
system, many of which will be mistaken  if only a 
few are compatible.  What that means is that we will 
be compelled to accept an anti-realism concern-
ing ecosystems: if what counts as an ecosystem is 
so subjective and so subject to interpersonal debate, 
then there are good grounds to be skeptical about 
their objective reality.  Clearly this fact is trouble-
some if we aspire to construct public policy with re-
spect to ecosystems – our policy might dramatically 
affect people’s lives by reference to something that 
does not even exist (a worry adamantly expressed by 
Fitzsimmons (1999, pp. 24-25, p. 145). 
It is at this stage that the distinction we drew 
above between AT and CT can play an informa-
tive role. Recall that according to AT there are in-
evitably pragmatic factors involved in the introduc-
tion of a term in a language system, independently 
of any attempt to provide empirical criteria for the 
use of this term. Moreover, with AT, we should al-
ways be tolerant both as regards what pragmatic fac-
tors are emphasized and how introduced terms are 
used. However the introduction of such pragmat-
ic factors works out, introduced terms can be in-
tended as descriptive of the world, irrespective of 
the pragmatic factors that (ubiquitously) play a role. 
Of course, we just noted that these pragmatic fac-
tors are especially troublesome where we are con-
sidering the term ‘ecosystem’ since, on this topic, 
people’s practical interests diverge greatly, result-
ing in profound disagreements about what to count 
as an ecosystem.  The effect of this disagreement is 
to lead one to an anti-realism about ecosystems – 
an anti-realism that is inescapable on AT since the 
pragmatic factors in term introduction are them-
selves inescapable.  The situation, however, is fun-
damentally different when we adopt the perspective 
of CT. On this approach, before pragmatic factors 
become relevant, we have the initial task of trying to 
locate empirical criteria to govern the use of intro-
duced terms.   Should this search for empirical fac-
tors succeed, then a term such as ‘ecosystem’ can 
be said to be descriptive of the world; it will be em-
pirically determined whether or not an ecosystem 
exists at a certain place or time, and will no longer 
be a matter of pragmatic choice.  Conversely, where 
the search for such empirical criteria fails, at that 
point pragmatic features become relevant and play 
a decisive role in introducing the term ‘ecosystem’. 
However, when this happens – when empirical cri-
teria for term introduction fail – it is not contend-
ed on the CT approach that the term ‘ecosystem’ is 
descriptive of the world.  Rather, ‘ecosystem’ now 
has the cognitive status of a ‘proposal’ to use lan-
guage in a certain way.  It is, as it were, a logical 
or philosophical term delineating a perspective on 
ecology, one motivated by practical considerations. 
As such we can be tolerant in deciding whether we 
introduce this term in our vocabulary, and if we do 
introduce it, in deciding how to use the term.  That 
tolerance, in any case, does not land us in an an-
ti-realism since in the absence of empirical criteria 
governing the introduction of the term ‘ecosystem’ 
we are not supposed to understand this term as de-
scriptive of the world.
In brief, then, CT provides an effective solu-
tion to the seemingly inevitable spectre of anti-re-
alism that confronts terms like ‘ecosystem’, terms 
that have their use profoundly influenced by practi-
cal interests.  It relegates as ‘philosophical’, a matter 
of ‘logical form’, terms that lack definitive empiri-
cal criteria for their use, but is nevertheless toler-
ant about the use of such terms, even so far as they 
are impacted by pragmatic interests, so long as their 
non-descriptive nature is kept firmly in mind.  With 
AT, conversely, term introduction is irrevocably im-
pacted by pragmatic factors and there is no prior re-
course to empirical factors to help maintain objec-
tivity. Where the introduced term is claimed to be 
descriptive of the world, this leads at least to a form 
of relativism: as term introduction is always prac-
tically motivated, one’s description of the world is 
practically motivated as well, leading to a picture of 
the world that is resolutely dependent on one’s in-
dividual interests. Of course, as we have seen, the 
situation is even worse if there is a diversity of prag-
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matic interests at play, as there characteristically is 
with the term ‘ecosystem’, for then there will be dif-
fering conceptions of the world without any objec-
tive way to arbitrate between these conceptions, a 
scenario that lands us in anti-realism.
But does AT necessarily lead us to relativism 
and anti-realism? One might resist this outcome 
by suggesting that once a term is introduced (tol-
erantly, pragmatically guided and descriptive) its 
use is nevertheless constrained by empirical fac-
tors and objectivity is restored. For instance one 
might introduce the term ‘ecosystem’ as referring 
to a holistic entity composed of interacting biotic 
and non-biotic components that possesses emer-
gent properties, without delineating beforehand (as 
with CT) specific empirical conditions under which 
an emergent property, and so an ecosystem, can be 
found.  One would simply stipulate that ecosystems 
have this feature, and perhaps motivate this stipu-
lation on the grounds of its inherent practical val-
ue.  Subsequently, empirical data might appear that 
impact this definition. For instance, there might 
be a geographic region that people describe as an 
ecosystem, but that lacks any identifiable emergent 
properties. Or, a set of interacting biotic and non-
biotic components with emergent properties might 
be found which people resist calling an ‘ecosys-
tem’.  In either of these circumstances one might be 
drawn to question the original term introduction, 
despite the practical benefits of this an introduc-
tion, thus dispelling the worry that term introduc-
tion according to AT lacks empirical constraints. 
In this way, one might assert, AT avoids the spec-
tre of relativism, or worse anti-realism: assuming 
empirical facts are themselves objective, pragmatic 
preconceptions that guide term introduction can be 
refuted, and those preconceptions that survive this 
testing regime have to some degree a claim to be-
ing objectively true, thus halting the slide to anti-
realism. 
Of course the key element to this approach is 
that the relevant empirical facts are themselves ob-
jective, which is a somewhat dubious possibility if 
the terms that ground the expression of these facts 
are themselves tolerantly and pragmatically intro-
duced via AT.  To be sure, the objectivity of the em-
pirical criteria that guide term introduction on CT 
is itself a difficult matter to assess – but at least 
with CT there is a concentrated effort to eschew 
pragmatic influences, as compared to AT where 
pragmatic factors are given full sway. For exam-
ple, suppose it turns out that pragmatic influenc-
es are irrevocable with term introduction, and that 
there is no way to be completely objective.  In such 
a case, the prescription with CT is that such a term 
is non-descriptive, for pragmatic dimensions are to 
be introduced only if empirical criteria fail, and if 
empirical criteria fail the term is deemed non-de-
scriptive.  In this way CT averts the slide to relativ-
ism and anti-realism. With AT, on the other hand, 
the irrevocability of pragmatic factors in term intro-
duction is in fact the norm and we are lead, as per 
usual, to relativism and (especially where there’s a 
multiplicity of pragmatic interests) to anti-realism. 
But let us set aside the issue of the objectivity of em-
pirical data and allow that empirical facts have an 
objective character with both AT and CT.  And once 
more let us consider the case where there are un-
toward empirical facts that challenge an introduced 
term such as ‘ecosystem’.  How might the introduc-
er of a term, if she is intent on preserving its legiti-
macy (again, with ‘ecosystem’, as referring to a ho-
listic entity with interacting biotic and non-biotic 
components and possessing unique emergent prop-
erties) respond to this challenge? With CT there is 
not much to be done if the term is intended to be de-
scriptive and the untoward empirical facts are strong 
enough, for empirical criteria alone will not support 
the use of the term. With AT, conversely, pragmat-
ic factors are allowed to weigh in and, if they are 
strong enough, could counterbalance the contrary 
negative evidence. AT provides no prohibition on 
such a strategy for it views term introduction is an 
outright tolerant and pragmatic affair, with no em-
pirical accountability.  If it is convenient to rule out 
contrary empirical evidence, then one can simply 
view the matter that way. On AT, should empiri-
cal obstacles arise for an introduced term and one 
is nevertheless committed to this term and its ap-
plicability, then one must of course cope with these 
empirical obstacles and perhaps judge that the term 
is illegitimate. Alternatively, though, one could just 
as well for purely pragmatic reasons adjust one’s 
world view and language system by incorporating 
new guidelines for term introduction that expressly 
discount this contrary evidence.  It is because AT 
allows such innovations that one worries about the 
slide to anti-realism.
To summarize then, there is no easy solution for 
AT if we want to halt the progression to relativism 
as well as the prospect of anti-realism.  Still, there 
are further philosophical problems to be addressed 
here, such as illuminating the nature of the empiri-
cal data that can serve the role allotted to it in CT. 
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In Hudson (2010) I describe and defend a Carna-
pian approach to this problem which involves a be-
haviourist reading of empirical data.  My task now, 
though, is to defend CT along different lines.  I pro-
pose to show how an analysis of term introduction 
along the lines of CT better fits the views of both a 
philosopher of ecology (Jay Odenbaugh) and a key 
ecologist (Eugene Odum), thus underlining the in-
terpretive viability of CT over AT.
Odenbaugh and Odum – meeting the 
empirical challenge
 We discussed earlier the challenges encoun-
tered by Robert Whittaker and Margaret Davis in 
locating empirical criteria for the boundaries of 
plant communities. As Odenbaugh (2007) recounts, 
Whittaker struggled to empirically locate on the ba-
sis of moisture and temperature gradients where one 
plant community stops and another starts; and Da-
vis failed to find empirical indicators demonstrating 
that ancient forests maintained their constitutional 
integrity through the migration of their constituent 
tree species.  But from this position of empirical im-
precision Odenbaugh doesn’t resort to introducing 
pragmatic considerations as a way of resolving this 
imprecision. Primarily he regards the conclusion 
that plant communities are empirically ill-defined 
as hastily drawn on the basis of minimal evidence; 
for him such a conclusion needs to be supported 
by more than Whittaker’s gradient and Davis’ an-
cient forest migration evidence. In service of show-
ing that the existence of coherent  plant communi-
ties is empirically defensible, Odenbaugh suggests 
that such communities be viewed as ‘smaller’ and 
‘more ephemeral’ than usually understood  (2007, 
pp. 637-638). He doesn’t suggest any principled rea-
son for such a suggestion – though we might sus-
pect that such a change makes the sort of interde-
pendence needed for community existence easier 
to maintain.  Nevertheless, whether or not this ap-
proach works in creating coherent and identifiable 
plant communities is for him an empirical question, 
and “as such must be left to the empirical investi-
gations of ecologists” (p. 639). As regards ecosys-
tems Odenbaugh recognizes that, here too, there is 
empirical imprecision, and as a way of illustrating 
this imprecision he quotes a passage from Fitzsim-
mons (1999) highlighting the widely different ways 
in which different government agencies and NGOs 
identify ecosystems (Odenbaugh, 2007, p. 640, cit-
ing Fitzsimmons, 1999, p. 3).  Odenbaugh’s initial 
response to this imprecision is to suggest a plural-
ism about ecosystems – perhaps the divergent views 
of all these organizations on what counts as an ‘eco-
system’ are one and all correct.  His more consid-
ered response, however, if we want to “demonstrate 
the nature and existence of ecosystems” (p. 640), is 
to ‘operationalize’ the notion of an ecosystem.  On 
behalf of this approach he suggests the example of 
watersheds.  He comments:
a watershed is an area of land that drains 
downslope to the lowest point. Watershed 
boundaries follow major ridgelines around 
channels and meet at the bottom, where water 
flows out of the watershed into streams, riv-
ers, or lakes.  The nutrient and energetic flows 
have differential rates inside and outside the 
drainage basin.  Given the existence of water-
sheds, I would argue that at some ecosystems 
have objective boundaries (2007, p. 640).
The empirical criterion for ‘ecosystem’ being sug-
gested, if one looks closely at this passage, is not so 
much the watershed boundary but a certain rate of 
nutrient and energy flow, one supported by the ex-
istence of a watershed.  Nevertheless, the important 
point for us is this: in responding to the boundary 
(or imprecision) problem, Odenbaugh’s suggestion 
is not to succumb to the temptation of pragmatism 
(an option vigorously derided by Fitzsimmons) but 
rather to identify empirical criteria that will work in 
restoring the needed empirical precision for ecosys-
tems. In other words, Odenbaugh tacitly endorses 
CT as the methodology that governs how we should 
approach term introduction.
Some success in establishing empirical criteria 
for the identification of ecosystems may be found in 
the work of Eugene Odum. Earlier on we saw some 
of the problems Odum and Barrett encountered 
identifying non-artificial boundaries to ecosys-
tems.  Odum’s approach, however, is in fact decid-
edly holistic.  He provocatively comments, “the old 
folk wisdom about ‘the forest being more than just 
a collection of trees’ is . . . the first working princi-
ple for ecology” (1977, p. 1289), a statement repeat-
ed verbatim in his 2005 textbook (Odum & Barrett, 
2005, p. 8). To illustrate this emergentist phenom-
enon Odum and Barrett (2005, p. 7) use the oft-cit-
ed example of the emergent properties of water giv-
en the combination of oxygen and hydrogen.  Such 
emergence is analyzed by them in terms of the un-
predictability of water’s properties given the prop-
erties of its molecular components.  Of course the 
unpredictability criterion is troublesome, as recog-
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nized long ago in Tansley (1935), and recognized 
more recently in the ecological literature by Edson, 
Foin and Knapp (1981).  Nevertheless Odum pro-
vides a striking example of how an ecosystem (or a 
biotic community) can possess properties that, at 
least, are very surprising given the properties of the 
ecosystem’s components, an example based on re-
search he performed with his brother Harold Odum 
on a coral reef at Enewetak Atoll in the Pacific 
Ocean in 1954 (see Odum H. & Odum E., 1955). 
The Odums found that this reef maintained a high 
rate of primary productivity despite the low nutri-
ent content of the surrounding ocean (Odum H., & 
Odum E., 1955, p. 319, Odum, 1977, p. 1290, and 
Odum & Barrett, 2005, pp. 7-8; see also Johannes 
et al. 1972).  As Odum (1977) describes the result:
the inflow of nutrients and animal food 
from surrounding ocean waters was inade-
quate to support the reef if corals and other 
major components were functioning as in-
dependent populations (p. 1290).
For the Odums, this (emergent) empirical phenom-
enon serves as a sign that the reef is an ecosystem 
involving symbiotic interactions between constitu-
ent plant and animal communities, an indicator that 
doesn’t require a preliminary drawing of boundar-
ies but, instead, a ‘reading off’ of these boundaries 
given the physical dimensions of the reef wherever 
these symbiotic interactions are occurring.
 What we see then is that, for the Odums, as for 
Odenbaugh, the solution to the boundary problem 
is not found in pragmatics but in the identification 
of useful empirical criteria that serve to demarcate 
biotic communities and ecosystems.  In this sense 
then they are tacit advocates of CT, of the view that, 
at least with regard to the terms ‘biotic communi-
ty’ and ‘ecosystem’, empirical criteria govern term 
introduction without prior recourse to pragmatic 
considerations.  Overall, then, they are a part of a 
tradition of ecological thinking, expressed by Kern-
er, Pound and Clements, Gleason, Tansley, Linde-
man, Whittaker, Davis, and no doubt others, who at 
least saw the point in starting out purely empirically 
in identifying ecological entities, and who, if they 
eventually resort to pragmatics, would do so as a re-
sponse to the failure of the pure empirical approach. 
Consider, conversely, if ecologists were advo-
cates of AT. Their first step then, in introducing 
a term such as ‘ecosystem’, would be to state their 
pragmatic preferences right from the top. For exam-
ple, suppose an ecologist has an interest in ensuring 
his property rights against eco-activists.  He might be 
worried that, if the government adopts a certain def-
inition of what constitutes an ecosystem, his prop-
erty rights would be abridged. Thus, in the interest 
of protecting these rights he vouches for a certain 
way of defining ‘ecosystem’ that serves this interest. 
This strategy, obviously, strikes many as anti-scien-
tific and empirically irresponsible: but it is precise-
ly the strategy that is warranted by AT in so far as 
it expresses ‘absolute tolerance’ on what pragmatic 
interests can motivate term introduction.  As such, 
it is hard to believe that Carnap would have actual-
ly approved such a reading of tolerance, especially 
considering that he thinks his views to be “closer to 
that of physicists and those philosophers who are in 
contact with scientific work” (1963, pp. 17-18).   At 
this stage the natural response for those who wish to 
ascribe to Carnap an ‘AT’ interpretation, one that 
is consistent with his empiricist scruples, is to point 
out that defining a term in a certain way is no guar-
antee that the world will cooperate. For instance, the 
above property owner may define ‘ecosystem’ how-
ever he likes, but empirical facts can be very unpre-
dictable and may not support his practical interests 
in other ways. Yet what stops the property owner in 
such a case from returning to his initial term intro-
duction and adjusting his language system in a way 
that arbitrarily preserves his conception of an eco-
system and suits his pragmatic interests? Of course 
where tolerance is understood ‘absolutely’, there is 
no prohibition here. But again, the AT proponent 
one might respond: the property owner can redefine 
‘ecosystem’ as he likes and pragmatically coordinate 
its success, but that is no guarantee that there are 
ecosystems such as he conceives of them.  His view 
of ecosystems can be practically valuable and em-
pirically confirmed through careful ad hoc adjust-
ments, but may not reflect ecological reality. This, 
however, is to put a point on the basic problem with 
AT: it not only embraces a fundamentally relativistic 
view of science, it leads to an anti-realism as well, for 
the picture of the world generated by being absolute-
ly tolerant and pragmatic about term introduction is 
one for which there is little hope of accuracy.
Conclusions
In this paper I have attempted to justify CT 
as the preferred approach to term introduction by 
showing 1) that it contains the key to averting the 
anti-realism and relativism endemic to those sci-
ences with a strong pragmatic component (such as 
ecosystem science), and 2) that the history of the 
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ecosystem concept as portrayed in the work of ecol-
ogists has a pattern that can be effectively charac-
terized in terms of CT: traditionally, ecologists have 
sought to begin with empirical criteria that will 
constrain their use of the term ‘ecosystem’, and in 
not finding suitable empirical criteria have resort-
ed to pragmatics in introducing this term. No doubt 
there will be philosophers who will regard the ap-
proach I have taken here as regressively positivistic 
(and who may regard the ecologists themselves as 
regressively positivistic, if my portrayal of them is 
accurate).  Criticism of this sort would likely focus 
on the adequacy of CT as regards to the task of set-
ting empirical criteria for term introduction.  Along 
these lines let us look at two sorts of critiques of CT.
First of all, with CT, one attempts to locate 
(non-pragmatic) empirical criteria that will govern 
the introduction of a term, criteria which will en-
sure that introduced terms are capable of being de-
scriptive of the world. They will empirically deter-
mine whether or not an ecosystem exists at a certain 
place or time, an issue that will not just be a matter 
of pragmatic choice.  However, within these empiri-
cal confines there is a lot of flexibility. For instance, 
consider two rudimentary definitions of the term 
‘biotic community’: (a) the set of all individuals of 
all species within a delimited area, and  (b) the set of 
all individuals of all species within a delimited area 
in which ‘emergent properties’ are produced by the 
interactions of constituent individuals. Assuming 
there are such things as emergent properties, and 
that we have a precise empirical characterization of 
an emergent property, which definition should an 
ecologist adopt?  Both definitions introduce empir-
ical conditions for the use of the term, and there are 
many other alternative, empirical criteria here that 
we could have adopted. So how do we adjudicate be-
tween the various the empirical criteria that can be 
used to govern the introduction of the term ‘biotic 
community’?
The key to responding to these concerns is to 
note that the empirical criteria that play a role in 
term-introduction are not meant to be fixed in 
stone. As a science develops, scientists are free to 
return to and revise these criteria later on.  In fact, 
this is the sort of revision we see suggested by Oden-
burgh. Robert Whittaker, recall, was working with 
a set of empirical determinants on biotic commu-
nities: he examined the possibility that such com-
munities could be tracked by the use of moisture 
and temperature gradients. And, as we saw, this 
approach failed due to the boundary problem; we 
were not left with identifiable boundaries between 
one community and the next.  What this suggests 
is that Whittaker’s presumed set of empirical cri-
teria needs to be discarded, and as an alternative 
Odenburgh proposes empirical criteria (never fully 
elaborated by him) that would entail ‘smaller’ and 
‘more ephemeral’ biotic communities than usually 
thought.  But Odenburgh recognizes that even this 
revised approach might fail, dependent on further 
empirical investigation. This is how we should ex-
pect the process of term introduction to go: not as 
an activity where the definitions of terms are em-
pirically settled one-and-for-all, but as a process in 
which the empirical criteria governing term use al-
ters over time.
It is the character of CT that such revisions 
would be motivated empirically and that, if not, the 
descriptive nature of the relevant definitions would 
be lost. By comparison, with AT revisions could be 
made for purely pragmatic reasons, which is the 
source of our concern with AT.
The second concern with CT is whether it is 
feasible to have empirical criteria for term introduc-
tion that are indeed free of pragmatic influences, 
and related to this, whether it is even desirable to 
have criteria ‘pragmatically sanitized’ in this fash-
ion.  In response, it is worthwhile noting that CT 
is not entirely free of pragmatic factors. Such fac-
tors will inevitably motivate the decision to intro-
duce some term rather than another, and more gen-
erally will impel someone to investigate a particular 
subject matter. It is, for example, usually a prag-
matic issue that motivates people to study environ-
mental science in the first place (such as concerns 
about global warming or species extinctions), and a 
further pragmatic matter that leads them to investi-
gate ecosystems as a whole rather than just the indi-
vidual species that make them up (for example, one 
might harbour the belief that the best way to save a 
species is to preserve the ecosystem of which it is a 
part).  But these sorts of pragmatic issues, as impor-
tant and ubiquitous as they are, need not influence 
the content of an introduced term (as Cole, 1992 
notes): one might think it valuable to think of the 
natural world as constituted by ecosystems, but that 
doesn’t determine what an ecosystem is, just as one 
might think that red is the best colour, but that, too, 
doesn’t determine what red is. As regards the con-
tent of a term, there is nevertheless always some el-
ement of pragmatism concerning the scope of the 
application of the term: whereas pragmatic influ-
ences can do little to affect whether one takes a stop 
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sign to be red in broad daylight, they might having 
a bearing on whether a stop sign is red in the dark, 
or when illuminated with a bright green light. But 
here we are considering ecosystems in their most 
basic, natural manifestations (e.g., naturally occur-
ring lakes, rivers and forests), and as we saw above, 
in defining such ecosystems, ecologists readily fol-
low the two-step approach recommended by CT, to 
first seek an empirical determination for ‘ecosys-
tem’ and failing that to resort to a more pragmatic 
approach.
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